TL;DR: Vietnam Hotel Investment: Mid-Market Opportunity for 2026
Vietnam's hotel investment market crossed USD 125 million in transaction volume in 2025, up 25% year-on-year, and JLL has explicitly forecast 2026 as a "breakout year" for hotel M&A. International arrivals hit 21.17 million in 2025 -- a new all-time record and 17.8% above 2019 pre-pandemic levels -- with January 2026 alone delivering 2.5 million arrivals, the highest single month ever recorded. RevPAR grew 17.1% nationally for the full year; Phu Quoc grew 60%+ in the first half of 2025 alone. Yet the most compelling part of the Vietnam thesis for Singapore-based fund investors is not the luxury gateway story -- it is the mid-market conversion opportunity buried inside a hotel stock that is 68% unbranded and owner-operated. At current transaction yields of 6-7.5% narrowing toward the 8-9% PE target range, with 8%+ GDP growth underwriting domestic corporate demand, and a Singapore-Vietnam DTA providing treaty WHT efficiency, the structural case is building. For the APAC-wide context, see our APAC Hospitality Investing: A Country-by-Country Allocator Guide and our Singapore VCC for Hospitality Funds: A 2026 Allocator's Guide.
The narrative around Vietnam hotel investment has typically been told through the lens of gateway luxury -- new Fairmont, Four Seasons, Ritz-Carlton and Waldorf openings across Hanoi, HCMC and Da Nang. That story is real, but it is not where the risk-adjusted opportunity sits for a Singapore-domiciled PE fund in 2026. The more compelling play is the 68% of Vietnam's upscale-to-luxury hotel stock that remains unbranded and owner-operated: family-owned four-star assets in secondary cities like Vung Tau, Ninh Binh, Hai Phong and Hue, where there is no professional revenue management, no loyalty distribution, no brand affiliation, and no institutional capital competing for the deal.
These assets operate at midscale ADRs of USD 80-90 with occupancy in the 60-70% range -- not because the demand is weak (Vietnam's GDP is growing at 8%+, domestic corporate travel is accelerating, and regional Asian mid-market travelers are the fastest-growing segment in Southeast Asia), but because the operator lacks the tools to capture it. Attaching an IHG, Marriott or Accor management contract to a 150-room asset in Hai Phong or a beachfront property in Vung Tau typically adds 200-400bps to RevPAR yield within 24 months of conversion. Entry prices on these assets are materially lower than equivalent gateway-city luxury deals, making the per-key return profile attractive relative to the Hanoi and HCMC five-star acquisitions that are trading at 6-7.5% yields and still wide of the PE target.
Avison Young Vietnam CEO David Jackson has specifically cited mid-to-high-end segments in secondary cities as underserved by professional management, creating arbitrage opportunities. Vietnam also lacks a deep domestic third-party management ecosystem, meaning the transition toward international management contracts is creating JV structures where Singapore PE funds can bring capital plus brand affiliation while local partners provide land rights and regulatory access -- the exact partnership dynamic that the Singapore-Vietnam bilateral investment framework is built to support.
Hotel transaction volume in Vietnam reached USD 125 million in 2025, up approximately 25% from the prior year. JLL Vietnam, which advised on USD 54 million in real estate transactions capturing 94% market share as the country's top investment advisor, has explicitly forecast 2026 as a "breakout year" for hotel M&A led by four- and five-star properties in Hanoi and HCMC. The most notable disclosed deal was Kido Group's acquisition and rebranding of Park Royal Saigon as Garden Plaza in Q3/2025 -- a domestic conglomerate move that illustrates the current buyer composition: Vietnamese domestic buyers (Kido Group, Sun Group, BIM Group) are the most active acquirers, with foreign PE funds on the bid side but not yet clearing at volume.
The structural barrier is a bid-ask spread. Foreign PE buyers demand 7-9% unlevered yields; current asset cash flows are generating 6-7.5% on recent transactions. JLL's Senior VP Karan Khanijou has noted that the gap is narrowing, with returns of 6-7.5% "approaching" investor expectations of 8-9%. The narrowing is being driven by operating performance improvement -- RevPAR growth of 17%+ nationally in 2025 is lifting cash flows toward the yield thresholds that unlock PE deal flow -- rather than by asset price reduction. The 2026 deal environment should therefore see more transactions close as asset-level performance catches up with bid-side pricing expectations, particularly in HCMC and Hanoi urban assets where the supply picture is most favorable.
Most distressed assets are held by leveraged property developers seeking portfolio restructuring, creating motivated seller dynamics that are absent in the Japan or Singapore primary markets. The off-market nature of most transactions adds an information advantage premium for investors with local networks and domestic JV partners -- a structural feature of the Vietnam market that is unlikely to change quickly given the land registry opacity and relationship-driven deal culture.
| Market | Investor Target Yield | Current Transaction Yield | Gap / Direction |
|---|---|---|---|
| HCMC (4-5 star urban) | 7-9% | 6-7.5% | Narrowing -- RevPAR growth closing gap |
| Hanoi (4-5 star urban) | 7-9% | 6-7.5% | Narrowing -- constrained supply supporting rates |
| Da Nang / Phu Quoc (resort) | 8-10% | 5.5-7% | Wider -- seasonality + condotel risk discount |
Vietnam's 2025 tourism performance was the strongest in the country's recorded history. International arrivals reached 21.17 million, up 20.4% year-on-year and 17.8% above 2019 pre-pandemic levels -- the first time Vietnam has crossed the 21 million threshold. Domestic arrivals reached 137 million (+24.5% YoY). January 2026 carried 2.5 million international arrivals alone, up 21% month-on-month and the highest single month ever recorded. The government's 2026 target of 25 million international visitors and 150 million domestic trips targets approximately 1.12 quadrillion VND in total tourism revenue -- an 18% uplift from 2025 actuals.
Source market composition in 2025 was led by China at 5.28 million arrivals (+41.3% YoY, recovering to approximately 91% of 2019 levels), South Korea at 4.33 million (slight -5.2% YoY, reflecting flight capacity normalization rather than demand decline), Taiwan at 1.23 million, the US at approximately 750,000, and Russia at 690,000 (roughly three times 2024 levels -- the fastest-growing major market). European arrivals grew 38.8% YoY. Vietnam's expanded visa-free policy -- extended to 45-day stays for most nationalities -- and continued direct aviation route growth are structural demand drivers rather than cyclical ones: these policy decisions represent a durable shift in Vietnam's tourism access profile that will compound over multiple years.
The China recovery trajectory is the most important variable to watch for 2026 and beyond. At 91% of 2019 levels in 2025, China is approaching full recovery -- but the composition has shifted. Chinese visitors spending on premium accommodation and F&B is growing faster than the budget segment, which is supportive of the mid-market and upper-midscale thesis specifically. A full China recovery to 2019+ levels would add approximately 600,000-800,000 incremental arrivals and provide meaningful RevPAR uplift for coastal and secondary city markets that are more China-dependent.
National hotel performance in 2025 showed broad-based RevPAR growth across all major Vietnam markets, with particularly strong performance in coastal leisure destinations. Nationally, ADR reached approximately VND 2.98 million (+7.2% YoY) and RevPAR hit VND 2.04 million (+17.1% YoY), reflecting the combination of occupancy recovery and rate improvement that characterizes a market transitioning from post-pandemic rebound to structural growth.
HCMC was the standout urban performer: Q4/2025 ADR hit VND 3.6 million (~USD 139) with occupancy at 83%, and full-year RevPAR grew 14.6%. The Q4 occupancy figure is particularly significant -- at 83%, HCMC's top hotels are operating at or near saturation in peak periods, creating pricing power for rate increases in 2026. With only 1,400 keys in the active HCMC development pipeline, the supply constraint that has underpinned this pricing is not about to be resolved. Hanoi grew RevPAR 6.1% YoY, with constrained supply supporting rates even as occupancy remains below HCMC levels.
Coastal markets delivered the most dramatic numbers. Da Nang RevPAR grew 19.3% with 2025 occupancy of 75% exceeding pre-COVID levels -- a demonstration that Da Nang's beach-leisure demand has structurally reset above the pre-pandemic baseline. Phu Quoc grew RevPAR 60%+ in the first half of 2025 alone, reflecting a catch-up from the island's delayed post-COVID tourism recovery and the arrival of new branded supply that is expanding the market's awareness and average rate.
| Market | 2025 Occupancy | 2025 ADR | RevPAR YoY Growth |
|---|---|---|---|
| HCMC | 72.0% (83% in Q4) | ~USD 133 (VND 3.45M) | +14.6% |
| Hanoi | 67.5% | Moderate growth | +6.1% |
| Da Nang | 75.0% | USD 121-140 (seasonal) | +19.3% |
| Nha Trang / Cam Ranh | 65.0% | Intl-branded ~70%+ occ | +11.8% |
| Phu Quoc | N/A (strong growth) | Premium resort rates | +60%+ (1H/2025) |
JLL's 2026 ADR forecast of +4-8% YoY across major markets is grounded in the same supply-demand picture: limited new urban supply in HCMC and Hanoi, sustained international arrival growth, and a domestic corporate travel base supported by 8%+ GDP expansion. The luxury and upper-upscale segment ADR averaged USD 142 in Central Vietnam (STR), while midscale and economy tracked USD 80-90 -- the segment range where the conversion thesis generates the most compelling risk-adjusted returns.
Vietnam's 248 active hotel construction projects totaling 84,079 rooms make it the #2 development pipeline in Asia Pacific ex-China -- ahead of Japan and Indonesia and behind only India. This is the most important supply-side caveat to the Vietnam investment thesis, and the one that most distinguishes it from Japan (which has a 1.7% supply ratio versus Vietnam's 21.3%). The pipeline is real, it is sizable, and for resort markets in particular, the absorption risk deserves serious underwriting attention.
However, the pipeline is not uniformly distributed. HCMC -- the market with the strongest operating fundamentals -- has only 1,400 keys in its active pipeline, making existing assets extremely valuable and insulated from near-term supply pressure. Hanoi similarly has constrained urban supply additions. The bulk of the pipeline is concentrated in coastal leisure destinations: Da Nang and Phu Quoc alone will absorb approximately 30% of all upcoming room allocations nationally. For resort assets in these markets, the investor question is whether the branded international arrival growth (Marriott's 10-hotel pipeline with Sun Group, Hyatt Regency Ho Tram, Rixos Phu Quoc at 1,700 rooms) expands the market faster than the pipeline adds rooms -- a genuine uncertainty that requires asset-level demand modeling rather than national-level optimism.
Notable 2026 openings that will set pricing benchmarks: Fairmont Hanoi (241 rooms) opened Q1/2026 in the Old Quarter, immediately establishing a new luxury ADR ceiling in the city; Reve HCMC -- a Vignette Collection by IHG (52 rooms) -- opened Q1/2026 as a boutique positioning play; Rixos Phu Quoc (1,700 rooms, Hon Thom Island) opens mid-2026 as Asia's first all-inclusive, a format that could both expand Phu Quoc's addressable market and introduce new competitive dynamics for existing branded resorts. Four Seasons Hanoi, Shilla Monogram Hanoi, and Mandarin Oriental Da Nang are upcoming additions that will further lift the luxury ceiling in their respective submarkets.
Foreign investment in Vietnamese hotels operates within a specific legal framework that every Singapore PE fund should understand before underwriting at the asset level. The foundational constraint is Vietnam's land ownership prohibition: foreign investors cannot own land in Vietnam, receiving instead a Land Use Right certificate (LURC) for a maximum of 50 years, renewable upon application. In special economic zones -- Phu Quoc, Van Don and others -- LURC terms can extend to 99 years for qualifying projects. Hotels are typically structured as Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) or as direct investment through a wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) or joint venture.
The condotel regulatory environment has been a persistent source of uncertainty. The 2023-2024 condotel reforms clarified that condotels (hotel-apartment hybrids) can receive residential land use right certificates in some provinces, but implementation remains inconsistent across localities. Most institutional PE investors avoid condotels entirely due to rental guarantee liabilities from developers and uncertain secondary market liquidity -- a sensible risk-management posture given the legal ambiguity.
For Singapore-domiciled funds, the standard entry structure is Singapore HoldCo -- Vietnam WFOE or JV, with the HoldCo holding the equity interest and the Vietnam entity holding the LURC and operating license. This two-level structure enables exit via share sale at the Singapore HoldCo level, potentially avoiding Vietnamese asset transfer taxes in some scenarios while maintaining treaty protection. Foreign investors can hold up to 100% in hotel operating companies, but LURC transfer and sublease require regulatory approval from provincial authorities, and coastal land positions require additional sign-off. Singapore is consistently Vietnam's #1 or #2 source of registered FDI -- a structural bilateral relationship rooted in the 1992 Singapore-Vietnam Bilateral Investment Treaty and the ASEAN Investment Agreement -- which means regulatory familiarity with Singapore investors is high at both the central and provincial government levels.
The Singapore-Vietnam Double Tax Avoidance Agreement provides materially favorable withholding tax treatment for Singapore VCC funds investing in Vietnamese hotel operating companies. Dividend WHT is limited to 5% for qualifying shareholdings (typically 70%+ ownership for 12+ months depending on treaty interpretation) and 15% otherwise, versus Vietnam's standard 10% statutory rate on dividends for non-treaty investors. Interest WHT is capped at 10% -- the same as Vietnam's standard rate on interest, meaning the treaty benefit on interest income is limited, but the dividend treatment is the primary structural advantage.
On capital gains: gains on disposal of Vietnam hotel assets held via a Singapore HoldCo structure are generally not taxable in Vietnam under the DTA if correctly structured, though Vietnam's transfer pricing rules require arm's-length documentation for related-party transactions. This capital gains protection is the most significant treaty benefit -- it means that exit via Singapore-level share sale can preserve the full disposal proceeds without Vietnamese capital gains tax leakage, a meaningful economic advantage relative to an asset-sale exit that would trigger Vietnamese asset transfer taxes. The MAS-regulated VCC structure also qualifies for the Global Investor Program passporting framework, easing LP fundraising from regional investors in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Indonesia for Vietnam-focused hotel sub-funds.
The VCC's sub-fund architecture is particularly well-suited to multi-asset Vietnam hotel portfolios: each asset can be ring-fenced in a separate sub-fund with segregated liability, protecting the broader fund from any single Vietnam asset's regulatory or legal complications -- a meaningful structural safeguard given Vietnam's evolving legal environment. BSH's Vietnam allocation operates within this sub-fund structure. We have publicly stated a 2032 SGX listing target, and the Vietnam sub-fund is sized to capture the mid-market conversion thesis while maintaining the treaty-efficient exit path that the Singapore-Vietnam DTA supports. For LP-level considerations on evaluating APAC multi-market fund exposure, see our post on Evaluating Hospitality LP Investments: A Due Diligence Framework.
| Income Type | Vietnam Standard Rate | Singapore-Vietnam DTA Rate | Structural Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dividends | 10% | 5-15% (shareholding-dependent) | Key treaty benefit; applies to annual OpCo distributions |
| Interest | 5% (resident lenders) | 10% | Treaty less favorable than domestic rate for interest |
| Capital gains on share disposal | Potentially taxable | Generally not taxable (Singapore HoldCo exit) | Requires arm's-length transfer pricing documentation |
| Asset transfer taxes | Applicable on asset sales | Avoidable via Singapore-level share sale | Key advantage of HoldCo exit structure |
Vietnam commands a 100-200bps yield premium over comparable Japan or Singapore assets from foreign PE funds for five structural reasons that are unlikely to resolve quickly, and investors should price these risks rather than assume they will dissipate over the holding period.
Legal and regulatory transparency is the primary risk. Vietnam's land registry, property title system and licensing regime involve provincial-level discretion that creates deal-specific legal risk at every stage of the investment lifecycle -- from initial due diligence (verifying clean title and LURC status) through to exit (ensuring the Vietnam entity's corporate records support a clean Singapore HoldCo share transfer). Watson Farley & Williams' Vietnam Hotel Investment Guide (October 2025) identifies title verification, foreign ownership documentation and provincial approval processes as the three most common sources of transaction delay and deal failure in Vietnam hotel M&A. Best-in-class legal due diligence is non-negotiable; cutting corners here is where deals unravel post-acquisition.
The supply pipeline is the second risk. Vietnam's 84,079-room development pipeline -- 21.3% of existing stock, compared to Japan's 1.7% -- represents a genuine absorption risk, particularly in coastal resort markets. Phu Quoc's 60%+ RevPAR growth in 1H/2025 is impressive, but the island is simultaneously absorbing Rixos (1,700 rooms), multiple Marriott and IHG openings, and ongoing condotel supply from pre-2023 development pipelines. The 2026-2028 absorption question in Phu Quoc is unresolved, and underwriting should stress-test occupancy at 55-65% for new supply years rather than extrapolating from current 75%+ performance at established branded properties.
Currency and repatriation risk is the third. The VND has depreciated approximately 3-5% annually against the USD/SGD over the past decade. For a fund earning VND-denominated hotel income and seeking to repatriate USD or SGD returns, this baseline depreciation is a cost of doing business in Vietnam -- not a tail risk. More acute is the risk of repatriation delays: Vietnam's foreign exchange management framework requires regulatory approval for dividend repatriation, and the timeline can extend under periods of balance of payments pressure. Maintaining cash buffers at the Vietnam entity level and planning repatriation cycles 6-12 months in advance is standard practice.
Condotel regulatory uncertainty is the fourth risk. The 2023-2024 reforms clarified some aspects of the condotel framework but did not resolve all ambiguities -- particularly around rental guarantee obligations from developers to condo-hotel unit purchasers, and the secondary market liquidity for individual condotel units. Funds that have inadvertently acquired properties with condotel supply overhang (unit owners exercising rental guarantee claims that dilute hotel operating income) face cash flow surprises that are difficult to model from a standard hotel underwriting. Avoiding condotel-burdened properties entirely is the cleanest approach; acquiring them requires explicit pricing of the legacy guarantee liability.
Geopolitical concentration is the fifth risk. Vietnam's tourism market is heavily dependent on Northeast Asian source markets (China, South Korea, Taiwan) that are themselves subject to bilateral diplomatic volatility -- as Japan's China experience in 2025 illustrated. A simultaneous deterioration in China-Vietnam and South Korea-Vietnam travel flows (which together represent approximately 9.6 million arrivals, or 45% of 2025 international total) would materially affect RevPAR across all Vietnam markets, with coastal leisure assets most exposed. The 38.8% YoY growth in European arrivals provides some diversification, but Europe remains a small base relative to Northeast Asia.
What is the difference between the mid-market and luxury thesis for Vietnam hotel investment?
The luxury thesis -- buying or developing five-star assets in HCMC, Hanoi or Da Nang at 6-7.5% yields -- requires a view that RevPAR growth will close the gap to the 8-9% PE yield target while asset values hold. It is credible given the HCMC supply constraint and continued premium demand, but the bid-ask spread means many luxury deals are not currently clearing at institutional terms. The mid-market thesis targets a different opportunity: 3-4 star assets in secondary cities (Vung Tau, Ninh Binh, Hai Phong, Hue) that are currently unbranded and owner-operated, where attaching an international management contract can generate 200-400bps of RevPAR uplift from a lower entry price base. The mid-market thesis is less dependent on asset price appreciation and more dependent on operational transformation -- it is a value-add strategy rather than a core-plus hold. The two theses require different GP skill sets, different local partner networks, and different exit routes.
How does the condotel risk affect hotel underwriting in Vietnam?
Condotels -- hotel-apartment hybrids where individual units are sold to retail investors under a rental guarantee from the developer -- can appear on the balance sheet of a hotel acquisition without being obvious from initial due diligence. If the target property has a condotel component where the developer guaranteed returns to unit purchasers (typically 8-10% annually for 5-8 years), those obligations may still be running and effectively represent a fixed cost that reduces hotel operating income. Additionally, condotel unit owners have property rights that can complicate hotel management decisions around room inventory, renovation and rebranding. Standard Vietnam hotel due diligence must include a review of all historical unit sale agreements, rental guarantee terms and remaining liability, plus a full mapping of who holds property rights to which keys in the building. Avoiding condotel-burdened properties entirely is the cleanest approach; acquiring them requires explicit pricing of the legacy guarantee liability.
Is a 50-year LURC term sufficient for hotel investment underwriting?
For a PE fund targeting a 5-7 year hold, a 50-year LURC from the date of acquisition provides adequate runway -- the terminal value assumption needs to be discounted to reflect the diminishing LURC term at exit, but this is a standard modelling adjustment rather than a dealbreaker. The more important question is what happens at LURC renewal: Vietnam law provides for renewal "upon application," but renewal is not automatic and requires the investor to demonstrate that the prior LURC was properly utilized and all obligations fulfilled. For large resort developments in special economic zones where the 99-year term is available, the longer duration meaningfully improves the exit valuation by providing the incoming buyer with a full-term LURC rather than a partially consumed one. For urban HCMC and Hanoi assets where 50-year terms apply and existing LURCs may already be partially consumed, the remaining LURC duration should be a specific underwriting line item rather than an afterthought.
What is the investment thesis for Phu Quoc specifically in 2026?
Phu Quoc's 60%+ RevPAR growth in 1H/2025 is a reflection of two converging forces: a delayed post-COVID recovery for the island (international access was constrained longer than mainland Vietnam) and the opening of new branded supply that has expanded awareness and driven first-visit international demand. The 2026 thesis for Phu Quoc is more nuanced. The Rixos opening (1,700 rooms, all-inclusive) introduces a format that could attract a new price-point segment and expand the island's total addressable market, but also adds significant new supply to an island where absorption capacity is geographically finite. For existing branded assets, the near-term competitive pressure from Rixos and other pipeline openings requires explicit occupancy sensitivity modeling. For opportunistic acquirers, the 2026-2027 supply absorption period may create acquisition opportunities in properties temporarily under occupancy pressure, at entry yields wider than the pre-supply-wave average -- the classic coastal development market acquisition window.
How does Vietnam's GDP growth rate affect hotel underwriting?
Vietnam's 8.02% GDP growth in 2025 (with IMF and ADB forecasting 7.1-7.2% for 2026) is the macro backdrop that makes the domestic corporate travel thesis credible. Corporate hotel demand in HCMC and Hanoi is driven by multinational manufacturing expansion (Vietnam is a primary beneficiary of supply chain diversification from China), the growth of domestic Vietnamese corporate activity, and the expansion of intra-ASEAN business travel. For a hotel fund, GDP growth at this rate directly supports weekday business occupancy for urban properties and provides a demand floor that is independent of international leisure arrival variability. The 7-8% growth range, if sustained, compounds: a Hanoi or HCMC hotel with 65-70% weekday business occupancy in 2026 is structurally better positioned than the same hotel with only leisure demand, because business travel is less seasonal and less price-sensitive to regulatory changes like Vietnam's expanded visa-free access.
What makes Vietnam different from other ASEAN frontier hotel markets?
Vietnam has three structural features that differentiate it from comparable ASEAN frontier hotel markets like Myanmar, Cambodia or Laos. First, the GDP scale and growth trajectory: at USD 430+ billion GDP growing at 8%+, Vietnam has an economy large enough to generate meaningful domestic corporate hotel demand independent of international leisure arrivals -- a demand base that Myanmar or Cambodia cannot replicate. Second, the regulatory reform momentum: Vietnam's 2023-2024 condotel reforms, 45-day visa-free expansion and FDI liberalization demonstrate a policy direction toward greater investment openness, even if implementation remains imperfect. Third, the brand pipeline quality: Marriott, IHG, Accor, Hyatt, Hilton and Four Seasons are all expanding aggressively in Vietnam in a way that validates the market's quality trajectory and provides institutional buyers with credible exit options via REIT or brand-affiliated trade sale that do not exist in smaller ASEAN frontier markets.
Bay Street Hospitality is a Singapore-domiciled hospitality private equity fund operating under the Variable Capital Company (VCC) framework, regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. We invest in upper-upscale and luxury hotel assets across Asia-Pacific, deploying capital through a multi-sub-fund VCC structure designed to maximize treaty efficiency and ring-fence risk across geographies. We have publicly stated a 2032 SGX listing target.
This content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice, an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to buy any securities or fund interests. Past performance is not indicative of future results. All investment involves risk, including the potential loss of principal. Prospective investors should conduct their own due diligence and consult their own legal, tax and financial advisors before making any investment decision.
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Bay Street Hospitality is a diversified hotel fund series for allocators seeking quant-driven exposure across top countries, operators, and hotel tiers. The fund targets a diversified portfolio in both high-growth emerging markets and stable developed markets, optimizing risk-adjusted returns. The leadership provides structured equity and pivotal strategic guidance to hotel-related investments. The fund establishes joint ventures with best-in-class partners, focusing on deal flexibility, currency considerations, tax efficiency, and clear exit strategies.
